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The property 'instinct' 
Jeffrey Evans Stake 
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 211 South Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA (stake@indiana. edu) 
Evolutionary theory and empirical studies suggest that many animals, including humans, have a genetic pre- 
disposition to acquire and retain property. This is hardly surprising because survival is closely bound up with 
the acquisition of things: food, shelter, tools and territory. But the root of these general urges may also run to 
quite specific and detailed rules about property acquisition, retention and disposition. The great variation in 
property-related behaviours across species may mask some important commonalities grounded in adaptive 
utility. Experiments and observations in the field and laboratory suggest that the legal rules of temporal pri- 
ority and possession are grounded in what were evolutionarily stable strategies in the ancestral environment. 
Moreover, the preferences that humans exhibit in disposing of their property on their deaths, both by dis- 
positions made in wills and by the laws of intestacy, tend to advance reproductive success as a result of 
inclusive fitness pay-offs. 
Keywords: extended phenotype; possession; intestate succession; endowment effect; inclusive fitness; 
paternity uncertainty 
1. INTRODUCTION 
People untrained in the law often think of 'property' as a 
relationship between a thing and a person. It is common for 
law professors to attempt to correct this lay notion by 
describing property as a relationship between people with 
respect to a thing. In denying the importance of the 
relationship between the person and his things, however, 
this professional view obscures the possibility that the insti- 
tution of property rests in part on deep-seated connections 
to and attitudes toward things. 
In the law, 'property' means rights in things. A woman 
has property when other persons share a respect for her 
relationship to some thing and are willing to enforce her 
rights. Embedded in the idea of property is the presump- 
tion that there are identifiable patterns in the resolutions of 
disputes over resources. In other words, there are criteria 
that determine how competing claims to assets will be 
resolved. It is possible that these factors, the determinants 
of property, are solely the product of laws and other 
conventions constructed by formal human organizations. 
Property, in such a view, rises and falls with human institu- 
tions. Bentham wrote (1914, pp. 145-147) 'there is no 
such thing as natural property: it is entirely the creature of 
the law. . . . Property and law were born together, and 
would die together. Before the laws property did not exist; 
take away the laws, and property will be no more'. 
This article proposes an alternative possibility: basic com- 
ponents of property preceded formal institutions; funda- 
mental principles of property are encoded in the human 
brain. There are obvious reasons to believe that a system for 
allocating rights in things could, at least in part, be hard- 
wired into animal brains. A scarcity of resources creates 
competition for them, and some forms of competition 
result in harm to the competitors. Rivals can reduce 
the costs of competition by adopting strategies for 
determining the outcome of fights without physical 
damage. For example, many of nature's agonistic 
encounters between conspecifics are won by the larger 
contestant (Moretz 2003). If the larger rival is certain 
to win, competitors can save themselves the costs of 
battle by allowing the size asymmetry to settle the dis- 
pute before they actually engage in battle. Such strate- 
gies can be evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith 1972; 
Maynard Smith & Parker 1976; Gibbard 1982). When 
an ESS is adopted by most members of a population, 
it cannot be invaded by the spread of any rare alterna- 
tive strategy (Krebs & Davies 1997). Thus, a body is 
more likely to survive if its brain is equipped with rules 
of property incorporating ESSs for reducing the costs 
of allocating resources among competitors. Property is 
part of human biology. 
This claim that legal rules are partly hard-wired might 
evoke the counter-argument that the sheer heterogeneity of 
those rules belies any significant genetic component. But 
that argument ignores the complex and continuous feed- 
back loop between nature and nurture. ESSs can and do 
fine tune themselves in many different ways over time and 
across populations. They can also take on cultural super- 
structures, extending the human phenotype (Dawkins 
1982) beyond our bodies. Just as humans share a universal 
grammar (Pinker 1994) despite wide differences in lan- 
guages, humans may share a core property 'instinct' despite 
differences in property law. We may have an adaptation, an 
evolved mental mechanism, for dealing with several of the 
issues that arise repeatedly with regard to resources. Like 
our languages, our various legal systems may be extensions 
of our human phenotype. Our laws, including our property 
laws, are part of the niches we have constructed for our- 
selves. One contribution of 16 to a Theme Issue 'Law and the brain'. 
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Our property instinct or mental adaptation might be 
nothing more than a natural inclination to learn the rules 
that other humans use to resolve the coordination problem 
inherent in resource disputes, much as we learn new words 
as toddlers to resolve the coordination problem inherent in 
communication. But it is also possible that the property 
instinct is more. An ability to recognize and, in appropriate 
contexts, adhere to specific conventions may be part of our 
behavioural repertoire. 
For example, we may have an innate sense of alienability, 
a natural feeling that one person may transfer things to 
another. If such a tendency is heritable and adaptive, it is 
not difficult to imagine a more efficient and more adaptive 
version: in addition to transferring the thing itself, it should 
be possible to transfer the rights to the thing. For such 
alienation to be proper according to our adaptation, the 
transfer must be voluntary. Here, the property instinct con- 
nects with an instinct for equity in reciprocal exchanges 
(Brosnan & de Waal 2003) and thus can be seen as one part 
of a sense of fairness or justice. 
Another component of our property instinct is an incli- 
nation for what to do with property. Instincts may tell us 
not only how to transfer property, but also to whom. These 
donative tendencies and the laws of inheritance that reflect 
them are discussed below. 
A property instinct could combine a general inclination 
to acquire rules with some specific pre-wired options. For 
learning language, the human brain may be programmed to 
gather grammatical usage examples from the childhood 
environment (verbs preceding or following their objects 
and adjectives preceding or following their complements, 
etc.) and generalize from those examples to a conclusion 
that the language is 'head-first' or 'head-last' (Pinker 
1994). Similarly, for learning property, the human brain 
might be endowed with an inclination to gather examples 
of resource allocation, and generalize from those examples 
to one of a range of available property rules. For example, 
humans might be programmed with three rules for initially 
allocating rights in a thing: to the first person to touch the 
thing, or to the older contestant, or to the dominant mem- 
ber of the group, all of which have the potential to seem 
'natural'. Which of these three rules to apply would be 
determined by the culture in which the human grows up. 
Whether evolutionary pressures acted precisely to create 
specific property rules or whether they created a probability 
distribution between sets of rules is not the focus here. It 
seems clear that there are certain rules of property that are 
recognized across a number of different species and have 
demonstrable adaptive value. These rules reflect what we 
could call a 'deep property structure' akin to the deep lan- 
guage structure. Recognizing this deep property structure 
may aid in understanding the rules of property and apply- 
ing them to new situations. 
2. FIRST IN TIME, FIRST IN RIGHT 
Being first in time to capture or create a thing often creates 
some right to that thing. Historically, first discovery gave 
nations rights in foreign lands. The common law of pro- 
perty in England and the US has, as one of its cornerstones, 
the notion that the first person to possess a thing owns it. 
Could first-in-time be an ESS? 
A first-in-time convention differs in an obvious way from 
the larger-wins convention mentioned above. The latter 
can be called a 'correlated' strategy because its winner is 
correlated to the winner in an actual physical fight (May- 
nard Smith & Parker 1976). Being first to possess, how- 
ever, does not correlate as positively with winning the fight 
over a resource. Indeed, being first can be a disadvantage. 
A cheetah exhausted from the chase and with its kill in its 
mouth fights from a weaker position than a late-coming 
competitor that did not participate in the hunt. 
First-in-time has both correlated and uncorrelated 
aspects: the first in time might be the fastest or smartest or 
otherwise possess a correlative adaptive advantage. But it is 
uncorrelated in that the first in time might also just be 
lucky. However, even if luck matters more, uncorrelated 
strategies can be evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith & 
Parker 1976). Avoiding a physical fight by deference to the 
first in time is just as effective in preserving genes as avoid- 
ing a fight by deference to the larger body. An uncorrelated 
strategy can be evolutionarily stable even when there is a 
correlated strategy also available (Hammerstein 1981). 
Whether correlated or not, a first-in-time-wins convention 
built into competitors could reduce their losses from fight- 
ing over resources. 
Therefore, it is theoretically possible for animals to be 
genetically programmed to be assertive in defending a 
resource they discover first and deferential when they come 
late (Maynard Smith & Parker 1976; Sugden 1986; Yee 
2003). There is also empirical evidence that nature embed- 
ded a rule of temporal priority in our brains before culture 
codified it in our laws. First in time is the natural rule of 
sunspot ownership for speckled wood butterflies (Davies 
1978; Epstein 1980), and it may be for swallowtail butter- 
flies as well (Maynard Smith & Parker 1976). Unless we are 
to believe that butterflies communicate this strategy as a 
matter of culture, members of a species may share a genetic 
predisposition to be aggressive when first in time and to 
give up easily when the opposing conspecific was first. 
It is important to stress that a first-in-time property con- 
vention, if there is one innate to humans, need not be a 
rigid routine that we follow in all contexts. Rather, like 
nearly all of our preferences, it takes the form of an incli- 
nation that sometimes predominates and at other times 
does not. Perhaps it plays a role only when the outcome of a 
fight does not matter very much (Grafen 1987). Neverthe- 
less, just as our genes give us a taste for eating sweets and 
fats, our genes may incline us towards fighting harder or 
less hard for an item depending on whether we were first. 
3. A NATURAL MEANING OF POSSESSION 
We may share with butterflies an evolved strategy that 
favours those who are first. But first at what? The legal 
answer is often 'possession'. In the words of Justice 
Holmes, 'possession is the beginning of ownership' 
(Missouri v. Holland 1920 252 US 416-435, p. 434). Pos- 
session is the root of title (Epstein 1979; Megarry & Wade 
1984; Rose 1985). But that does not really answer the 
question. If possession is the key, what does it take to estab- 
lish possession? Property law breaks possession into two 
elements: physical control and intent to assert control. 
The intent element seems natural in that it is closely 
related to, if not the same thing as, willingness to fight, 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004) 
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which in turn relates to the outcome of a physical contest 
over the resource. Willingness to fight may overcome 
inferior fighting ability. Smaller crickets defeated larger 
ones 30% of the time, possibly because they were more 
willing to fight (Hofmann & Schildberger 2001). If it mat- 
ters to nature, it should not surprise us that intention 
matters to the law. 
The other legal element of possession concerns the 
physical connection between the thing and its possessor. In 
a pair of nineteenth-century cases, Young v. Hichens (1844 
12 Q. B. 518-520) and Pierson v. Post (1805 3 Caines 
175-182, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1886)), English and 
American courts confronted this question of defining the 
physical connection required to establish possession or 
occupancy. The judges hearing the cases decided that title 
in a wild animal belonged not to the person that first had a 
reasonable prospect of taking control but rather to the per- 
son that first had actual control. In Young versus Hichens, 
the plaintiff had nearly encircled some fish with a net when 
the defendant intruded. In his suit against the interloper, 
the plaintiff's claim rested on an assertion of possession. 
But the court was unwilling to find the requisite possession. 
Lord Denman stated (Young v. Hichens, p. 611), 'what- 
ever the interpretation may be put upon such terms 
as " custody " and " possession ", the question will be whe- 
ther any custody or possession has been obtained here. I 
think it is impossible to say that it had, until the party had 
actual power over the fish'. 
Although property teachers often treat this important 
legal line as arbitrary, evolutionary theory suggests deeper 
roots. A strategy can work for the benefit of both parties 
only when both parties respond to the same environmental 
trigger. Both need to know when to be assertive, when to be 
deferential. Humans with a miscalibrated cognitive module 
for recognizing possession by others would have found 
themselves trying to obtain what was fiercely defended, 
whereas those who did not recognize their own possession 
would have failed to keep track of things that could have 
been easily secured. The result is that most of us descended 
from beings who could correctly determine who was first 
according to the convention. 
Evolutionary theory not only suggests that humans have 
a common sense of possession, it suggests two points about 
the content of that shared sense. First, the strategy must 
provide a single winner in a good number of situations; it 
can work only if it is based on some asymmetry. But differ- 
ent criteria harbour differing degrees of asymmetry. When 
the criterion serving as the basis for the convention has too 
little asymmetry, fights will occur. If fights occur often, the 
contestants employing that strategy will not survive as often 
as those employing an alternative, less symmetrical and 
thus more determinate strategy. The forces of selection 
probably defined our sense of possession to be highly asym- 
metrical, such that it would be exclusive in many cases. 
Second, the criterion that determines possession must 
be observable (Maynard Smith & Parker 1976). Duels 
between resident damselflies are usually won by the 
fatter contestant but cannot be settled quickly on that basis 
because their reserves of fat are stored inside their 
skeletons, out of view (Marden & Rollins 1994; Mesterton- 
Gibbons & Adams 1998). Crickets whose antennae have 
been shortened fight longer perhaps because they are less 
able to determine their opponent's willingness to fight 
(Hofmann & Schildberger 2001). For possession to work 
well as the hinge on which behaviour can pivot, possession 
has to depend on facts that can be perceived readily and 
reliably by the parties. Although it would help if both par- 
ties could observe whether the other is in possession, that is 
not strictly required. If the criterion is exclusive, it is 
enough that each party can tell whether he has satisfied the 
criterion. Conversely, the strategy of first-possession will 
have a hard time surviving as a strategy if a party cannot tell 
whether he himself has satisfied the criterion. 
The results in Young v. Hichens and Pierson v. Post are 
completely understandable on both these points. A first-in- 
time strategy based on an actual grabbing of the object 
satisfies the requirement of high asymmetry. It will be 
unusual for two claimants to have hold of an object at the 
same time. By contrast, it would be much more 
common for competitors to have a 'reasonable expectation' 
(Young v. Hichens) or a 'reasonable prospect' (Pierson v. 
Post) of securing the thing at the same time and thus be in 
simultaneous possession. Actual grabbing is also, of course, 
considerably more observable than the fleeting notion of a 
reasonable prospect of capture, the alternative rejected by 
the courts. 
There is evidence supporting this claim that law's physi- 
cal-control rule is of biological origin. Touching may be a 
key ingredient in animal possession. The male speckled 
wood butterflies in Davies's experiments fought 10 times as 
long when both had touched down on vegetation as when 
only one had done so. Being in close proximity or having a 
reasonable prospect of actual contact was apparently not 
enough for the butterfly to form the attachment needed to 
fight a protracted battle. It might not be a mere coincidence 
that physical touching is important to the law. 
Not only is touching important to possession, but animals 
have a means of recognizing touching by themselves, obvi- 
ously, and by others. A certain group of neurons fire when 
a monkey grasps a piece of food in a certain way 
(Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Moreover, when a monkey sees either 
another monkey or the human experimenter grasping the 
food, 'mirror neurons' fire in the subject monkey. Although 
there are 'mirror neurons' for many actions, the fact that there 
are neurons activated by grasping and by observing the act of 
grasping suggests that there are neurons associated with 
recognizing possession by ourselves and others. 
Thus, we may be programmed to recognize when we 
have a certain proximate relationship to a physical object 
and, by mirroring, to recognize when others have a similar 
relationship to an object. Our brains may then determine 
'ownership' by combining that relational data with infor- 
mation about previous relationships, such as information 
about who was first in time and what voluntary transfers 
have occurred. Certain combinations of information-'it is 
in my grasp' plus 'there is no previous owner'-may throw 
switches in our brains making us more willing to be assert- 
ive in excluding others from the thing. Such a neurological 
structure could provide part of the basis for a very natural 
law ofproperty. 
Maynard Smith (1982) referred to this strategy-defend 
aggressively when one is an owner and defer to the 
opponent when one is an intruder--as the 'bourgeois' strat- 
egy. Owners usually defeat intruders in a number of 
species, from baboons (Kummer et al. 1974) to damselflies 
(Waage 1988), and similar behaviour has been observed in 
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desert ants that mark their territories with pheromones 
and assert ownership when in territories marked by their 
colonies (Wenseleers et al. 2002), and in both sexes of 
Ozark zigzag salamanders (Mathis et al. 2000). In two 
species of colonial spider the larger conspecific wins, but if 
the contestants are of similar size, the resident usually 
defeats the intruder (Hodge & Uetz 1995). 
This is not to say that all animals must follow the bour- 
geois strategy. One species of Mexican spider, for example, 
seems to follow an anti-bourgeois strategy, with the 
owners fleeing upon the arrival of intruders (Burgess 
1976). Whether a population will evolve to bourgeois or 
anti-bourgeois may depend on resource-holding potential 
(Mesterton-Gibbons & Adams 1998). Indeed, no strategy 
will be an ESS in situations where it would make perma- 
nent reproductive losers of one group (Grafen 1987). 
Landowners seem to follow the bourgeois strategy when 
they defend their lands with their lives rather than surren- 
der them to invaders. Pape (2003) found that suicide 
attacks are carried out most often by persons who are trying 
to displace occupying invaders. 'In general, suicide terrorist 
campaigns seek to achieve specific territorial goals, most 
often the withdrawal of the target state's military forces 
from what the terrorists see as national homeland' (Pape 
2003, p. 344). 
Given the frequency of territorial behaviour in humans 
and other animals, it is reasonable to assume that there is 
some meaning of possession that is naturally shared among 
conspecifics. Even in the absence of law-especially in the 
absence of law-there are beneficial network externalities 
that arise from a common sense of ownership. When the 
nexus between a person and a thing becomes strong 
enough, he feels like the owner and others recognize him as 
the owner. The bourgeois strategy might have purely 
uncorrelated origins, or it might be based in part on an 
asymmetry in values. But whatever the origin, if a bour- 
geois strategy is part of our evolved psychological makeup, 
the necessary shared sense of when to be assertive and 
when to be deferential constitutes an innate sense of pos- 
session, and that common sense could be embodied in the 
common law's definition of possession. Because possession 
is, in turn, a block in the foundation of our law of 
property (Epstein 1979; Megarry & Wade 1984; Holmes, 
Missouri v. Holland 1920 252 US 416-435, p. 434), much 
of our property law could be built upon distinctions 
embedded in the structure of our brains. 
4. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE WAXING AND 
WANING OF ATTACHMENTS 
The rules that anchor the initial allocation of title in 
possession become easier to understand when we recognize 
that forming attachments may solve evolutionary prob- 
lems. Clearly the ownership convention is more compli- 
cated for humans than for butterflies. Ownership, once 
established, can be transferred and does not evaporate as 
quickly. Humans keep track of earlier occupancies. How- 
ever, even in societies recognizing potentially perpetual 
rights, ownership does not always last forever. Ownership 
in captured wild animals ends when they regain their natu- 
ral liberty (In re Oriental Republic Uruguay 1993 821 F. 
Supp. 950-956 (D. Del.); Mullett v. Bradley 1898 53 
N.Y.S. 781-783 (App. Div.)). 'In all these creatures, 
reclaimed from the wildness of their nature, the property is 
not absolute, but defeasible: a property, that may be 
destroyed if they resume their antient wildness and are 
found at large' (Blackstone 1766, p. 393). Rights in per- 
sonal property, in the US at least, end upon abandonment 
(Eads v. Brazelton 1861 22 Ark. 499, 79 Am. Dec. 88-102; 
Erickson v. Sinykin 1947 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W. 2d 172- 
178; Blackstone 1766, p. 9; Pollock & Wright 1888) and 
easements may terminate by abandonment (Crossley and 
Sons Ltd. v. Lightowler 1867 2 Ch. App. 478-486; R. v. 
Chorley 1848 12 Q. B. 518-520; Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Dubuque Sand & Gravel Co. 1977 258 
N.W. 2d 153-154 (Iowa); Megarry & Wade 1984). 
One of the most common involuntary terminations of 
rights occurs by virtue of the doctrine of adverse pos- 
session. This doctrine wrests legal title from the person that 
is the current title holder according to the records and 
reallocates that title to the current possessor, without the 
consent of the record title holder. The law of adverse pos- 
session raises a profoundly difficult issue: how can the law 
divest a rightful owner of his property and transfer it to a 
mere squatter? The normative nature of the issue explains 
the prominence of adverse possession in the law-school 
curriculum. Over the years, legal scholars have constructed 
many rationales for the doctrine, none of which is very 
compelling today, however appropriate they might once 
have been (Stake 2001). Can evolutionary science provide 
any insight into the persistence of this odd exception to our 
ordinary rules of perpetual ownership? Yes. 
(a) Studies of birds 
Experiments performed with birds indicate that the 
attachment to territory and the trauma of losing possession 
of territory increases with the length of possession. Krebs 
(1982) removed pairs of resident great tits from their terri- 
tories, kept them in captivity, and then released them after 
a replacement pair had settled in the vacated territories. 
The replacement birds that had been in possession for 3 h 
contested for ownership seven times longer than they did if 
they had just arrived, and they contested nearly twice again 
as long when they had been in possession for 10 h instead 
of 3 h. Beletsky & Orians (1989) found that replacement 
red-winged blackbirds that held territories for 6-7 days 
could usually defeat the original owners. Tobias (1997) 
removed European robins from their territories and then 
released them at varying periods after replacements had 
settled into those territories. The replacement robins 
defeated removed robins after the replacements had been 
in possession for 10 days in winter, and defeated removed 
robins for the bulk of the territory after only a single day in 
spring. 
The authors of the experiments interpret their results as 
supporting the 'value-asymmetry hypothesis'. Over time, 
the value to the original bird declines, but declines slowly. 
The value to the replacement bird increases, and increases 
faster than the value to the original bird declines. Eventu- 
ally, the value to the replacement exceeds the value to the 
original and the replacement will fight long and hard 
enough to fend off the original. If persistence and success in 
fighting for control of territory correlate with the pain 
of dispossession, that pain increases with the length of 
possession. 
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English law of territory ownership follows nature's lead. 
The adverse possession doctrine conforms to the principle 
reflected in the bird studies, that after the passage of time 
the value of the territory to the new claimant is greater than 
the value to the old claimant. To establish title by this pass- 
age of time, the squatter has to show that for the statutory 
period he had possession, that such possession was adverse 
to the owner, that it was continuous, that it was exclusive, 
and that the owner was out of possession (Megarry & Wade 
1984; Smith 1996). The requirement of possession assures 
that the squatter had physical control and the intent to 
maintain it. If his possession was continuous, it was 
unbroken by his own abandonment or by the possession of 
others. Thus the doctrine asks whether the adverse pos- 
sessor used the land as a true owner would, whether he 
showed the defensive, possessive attitudes one would 
expect of a true owner, and whether he formed the kind of 
attachment that leads to increased efforts in defence of 
territory. The requirements assure that the squatter did 
indeed form the strong ties that could be cut only with great 
pain. Conversely, the doctrinal inquiry also establishes that 
the record owner was not in possession and, therefore, does 
not feel like the typical owner of land and, hence, would not 
defend it to the same degree. As between the two clai- 
mants, the law allocates the loss to the non-possessor 
because the loss will hurt him less. 
(b) Studies ofhumans 
The doctrine of adverse possession also fits with what we 
are learning about the brain from experimental psychology 
and economics. People often demand more to give up some 
thing than they would be willing to pay for the exact same 
thing. Thaler (1980) called this pattern of underweighting 
of opportunity costs the 'endowment effect'. This anomaly 
is a manifestation of an asymmetry of value that Kahneman 
& Tversky (1984) dubbed 'loss aversion'. According to the 
theory of loss aversion, losses from one's endowment have 
more subjective impact than financially equivalent gains, 
and losses from endowment are more painful than losses of 
mere prospects (Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991; Korobkin 
2003). This difference in impact is greater than would be 
expected from considering declining marginal utility alone. 
In two experiments reported by Kahneman et al. (1990), 
the experimenters randomly divided subjects into three 
groups: buyers, choosers and sellers. The sellers were given 
coffee mugs, the choosers were given options to acquire 
coffee mugs and the buyers were given nothing. Sellers 
indicated the least they would take for their mugs, 
buyers indicated the most they would pay for mugs, and 
choosers indicated the price at which they would rather 
have cash than mugs. The experimenters found that 
subjects endowed with mugs placed a higher value on them 
than the choosers or the buyers. These experiments also 
support the conclusion that there is an endowment effect for 
cash, although the effect was smaller than for the corporeal 
coffee mugs (Stake 1995). 
The studies of bird territoriality and human endowment 
effects lead to the conclusion that duration of actual 
possession and expectation of ownership make a difference 
to a person's attachment to a thing. The property doctrine 
of adverse possession conforms to this adaptation of 
the brain, implicitly recognizing that the claimant in 
recent, lengthy, exclusive possession has formed a greater 
bond with the land and will fight harder for it. Property law 
resolves such disputes as they would be resolved in physical 
fights, without the need for combat. 
5. GROUP PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 
The resemblance of non-human animal behaviours to 
human property institutions discussed so far should not be 
taken as sufficient to conclude that animals have what we 
call property. The human institution of property incorpo- 
rates at least four elements. First, the owner must form 
some special relationship to the thing, such as being more 
willing to expend resources defending it. Second, con- 
specifics must in some way honour or respect the owner's 
relationship. Third, the owner must recognize that respect 
by others. Fourth, conspecifics as individuals or as mem- 
bers of the group must be willing to intervene on behalf of 
that owner, protecting the property from threats by chal- 
lengers, whether they be conspecifics or others. On the 
third and fourth points, more research is needed. 
Heinrich (1999) presents compelling evidence that 
ravens can gang together to protect their assets. He intro- 
duced a wild raven into a group of four ravens that had 
lived together nearly all of their lives. The four did not 
allow the wild raven to feed on the food pile in the aviary. 
With that access to food barred, the newcomer watched 
where the others cached emergency supplies from the food 
pile and tried to feed upon those caches. Although there 
was plenty of food to feed all five, the others killed the wild 
raven for her efforts to feed from their caches. 
More noteworthy are three other raven stories that 
Heinrich (1999) presents anecdotally. At Cornell Univer- 
sity, Kevin McGowan climbs trees to band ravens. Not 
only do ravens attack him when he comes into their terri- 
tory, but neighbouring ravens join in the attack to defend 
the territory of the residents. In separate incidents, Lorenzo 
Russo and Chris Walsh each reported being attacked by 
resident pairs. When the attacks were unsuccessful, the 
pairs flew off, only to return shortly with three or five help- 
ers, respectively, who joined in attacking the human inter- 
loper. This behaviour might be explained as instances of 
the helper ravens acting in anticipatory defence of their own 
territories, or the helpers may have been relatives acting in 
the interests of inclusive fitness. It could be the case, how- 
ever, that the behaviour was not just nepotism or immedi- 
ate self interest, but that it was an instance of reciprocal 
behaviour, neighbour ravens joining forces in group protec- 
tion of a member's property. There is a lot more research to 
be done, but these stories hint that even the human insti- 
tution of the group acting to protect the things of an indi- 
vidual may have ancient biological antecedents. 
6. WHAT HUMANS DO WITH THEIR PROPERTY, AND 
THE LAWS OF INTESTACY 
If humans have a property instinct, it ought to include not 
only respect for the possessions of others, protection of 
one's own possessions and helping in the defence of 
others', but also inclinations regarding what to do with 
those things that have been acquired. Obviously, people 
use assets to keep themselves alive, the evolutionary utility 
of which needs no discussion. It is worth noting, however, 
that the law recognizes this utility by allowing individuals 
great freedom in consuming assets as they please. Law 
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would undermine its own authority if it were to try to tell 
people how to use or not to use their things. 
Very often, however, people do not consume their assets, 
but give them to others instead. If people have a property 
instinct, how do these gifts fit into that instinct? Evolution- 
ary theory should allow us to predict donative behaviours 
as well as acquisitive and retentive behaviours. To whom 
do people give their property? In what ways does the law 
reflect those inclinations to make gifts? In other words, 
what is the phenotypical behaviour and in what way is the 
law an extension of that phenotype? Evolutionary analysis 
can parsimoniously explain several specific donative pre- 
ferences and, in doing so, explain some of the basic 
contours in the laws that apply when someone dies without 
a will, the laws of intestate succession. 
(a) Benefactors' blood relatives 
Because a parent is just a gene's way of making another 
gene, selection should favour those genes that make good 
parents, parents who produce viable offspring and help 
those offspring to reproduce. There are a number of ways 
parents invest in their offspring (Trivers 1972). For 
example, female Belding's ground squirrels put themselves 
at risk by sounding alarms to warn other squirrels of pre- 
dators. Sherman (1981) has found, however, that they are 
not indiscriminate in this risky warning behaviour. They 
make the alarm warnings more often when they have 
mothers, daughters or sisters nearby than when the sur- 
rounding squirrels are related less closely or not at all. 
Another important means of increasing offspring sur- 
vival and reproduction is the transfer of property, both 
tangible and intangible. Because property can be converted 
to food and shelter, parents, grandparents and more distant 
ancestors can enhance the chances that their offspring will 
survive by giving them property. 
Actual giving conforms to the theory. Smith et al. (1987) 
found that 1000 randomly selected wills left 92.3% of the 
wealth to spouses and kin and only 7.7% to non-relatives. 
Gifts completed during the life of the donor follow a similar 
pattern. Anderson et al. (1999) studied parental investment 
by men. Their data indicate that children of the current 
mate of the donor were three times as likely to receive some 
money for college if they were the genetic children of the 
donor than if they were step-children of the donor. Chil- 
dren of a previous mate of the donor were four times as 
likely to receive some money for college if they were the 
genetic children of the donor than if they were step- 
children of the donor. 
English and American laws of intestate succession follow 
this evolutionarily predictable pattern. The laws of descent 
and distribution allocate a large portion of a decedent's 
estate to surviving blood relatives. Indeed, if a decedent 
(deceased person) leaves no surviving spouse or relatives, 
the decedent's property escheats to the crown or state 
rather than going to in-laws, friends or other worthy reci- 
pients. We could explain the laws of intestacy on the theory 
that they were designed merely to mimic the testaments of 
persons who left wills. In this view, the law is simply being 
efficient. However, this efficiency explanation under- 
estimates the degree to which it is important for laws of 
intestate succession to reflect what feels natural, or fair, or 
just, to those empowered to determine the rules. If the rules 
favouring relatives do not seem fair at some basic level, they 
might not last long or garner much respect. 
(i) Genetic proximity 
The chances that a gene or allele is passed to a child are 
50%, because half of each person's genes come from each 
parent. The chances that a gene will reach a grandchild are 
only one out of four, that odds diminishing by a factor of 
two with each succeeding generation. A selfish gene should 
be less interested in helping more distant family members. 
For this reason, we would expect decedents' gifts to be con- 
centrated in closer relatives. This prediction is confirmed 
by both common experience and research by Smith et al. 
(1987), who found that decedents gave 46% of their wealth 
to relatives one-half related, 8% to relatives one-quarter 
related, and less than 1% to relatives one-eighth related. 
Evolution has selected in the human brain an inclination to 
give property to others, but that inclination is biased heav- 
ily towards persons who share a close genetic relationship. 
Laws of intestate succession follow this preference by 
providing that closer relatives take before more distant rela- 
tives. Both the English statute (Megarry & Wade 1984) and 
section 2-103 of the Uniform Probate Code (Langbein & 
Waggoner 2003), which has been adopted in many of the 
United States, provide that siblings, cousins and more dis- 
tant relatives of the decedent take nothing if children of the 
decedent survive. Thus, evolutionary theory explains the 
priority of closer relatives found in the laws of intestacy. 
(ii) Age of recipient 
Evolutionary theory also suggests that gifts to persons 
beyond reproductive years will generate no benefit for the 
donor's genes and, therefore, donors are less likely to give 
to elderly persons than to similarly related persons of child- 
bearing age. Adaptive giving would be expected to be 
biased towards donees who are most likely to have 
additional children. For example, a decedent is equally 
related to her children, siblings and parents, but in most 
cases she can do her genes more good by giving her pro- 
perty to her children rather than her parents because her 
children are more likely to reproduce. Moreover, a dece- 
dent's assets passed to parents or siblings are likely to end 
up in the hands of nephews and nieces, who are not as 
closely related to the decedent as her own children. 
Once again, research by Smith et al. (1987) confirms the 
prediction of evolutionary theory with regard to the behav- 
iour of testators (persons who died with wills). The dece- 
dents in the study gave 38% to their children compared 
with only 8% to their siblings and nothing to their parents. 
Of course, there are other explanations: older relatives 
might also tend to be less needy because they have had 
more time to accrue resources. Turning from testate to 
intestate succession, when the law distributes assets on 
behalf of a decedent who has not executed a will, it tracks 
the general preference for younger persons, allocating the 
estate to the living children or their issue, if there are any, 
rather than to the decedent's parents or siblings (Megarry 
& Wade 1984; Uniform Probate Code section 2-103 
(Langbein & Waggoner 2003)). 
The optimal evolutionary strategy gets more compli- 
cated when there are no children and the choice of 
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beneficiaries is between parents and siblings. When a child- 
less person is old enough to have children, his parents are 
unlikely to produce many more children and it makes sense 
to send his assets to his siblings rather than his parents, the 
younger generation being generally more likely to convert 
resources into additional copies of the donor's genes. At 
about the same time that people gain the physical capacity 
to have children, they gain the legal capacity to execute a 
will, and as just noted those wills tend to allocate assets to 
fecund siblings over ageing parents. 
However, when a person is too young to have children, it 
is likely that some of her siblings are also too young to have 
children and that her parents are still young enough to 
produce additional children. In such situations, it makes 
biological sense for her to send her assets to her parents, 
who may still be able to have children and in any case will 
be likely to spend some of the assets supporting their other 
children, the decedent's siblings. Indeed, if the siblings are 
minors, the parents will probably spend the assets more 
wisely and effectively on behalf of the siblings than the sib- 
lings would do themselves. Furthermore, the parents are 
better able to tell who in the family would benefit most 
from the assets and are likely to allocate the assets 
efficiently, allocating them to one child or spreading them 
around as needs be. Allocating the decedent's assets to all 
her siblings might spread the assets too thinly, for example. 
If the decedent does not have children, her genetic interests 
are the same as her parent's interests, and they might be 
better at furthering the family genes by focused giving than 
an automatic allocation of equal portions to all siblings. 
Most Anglo-American laws of descent and distribution 
conform to this biological priority by giving to parents 
before turning to siblings of the decedent. If the parents are 
dead, however, the assets will pass to the siblings. Thus the 
law makes a rough cut, favouring children when there are 
some, and then going next to parents if there are no chil- 
dren, which makes sense when the decedents are too young 
to write a will. 
(iii) Paternity uncertainty and maternity certainty 
An efficient gene, one designed to make the most of its 
resources, would build a brain that avoids wasting resour- 
ces on persons who are less likely to carry that gene. Half of 
all parents, the male half, cannot be completely confident 
that their children are indeed the product of their gametes. 
To the extent that a man is uncertain a child is his, we 
should expect him to be less inclined to allocate property to 
that child. Conversely, we should expect to see greater 
giving when certainty of parenthood is higher. Once again, 
the pattern of actual giving tracks the evolutionary theory. 
Buss (1999) reports that Anderson et al. (1999) found that 
children of the few men who expressed uncertainty in their 
paternity were much less likely than the children of confi- 
dent fathers to receive money for college from those 
fathers. 
Older versions of the Uniform Probate Code expressly 
recognized the uncertainty surrounding paternity and the 
preference of men for not giving to the children of other 
men. Before 1990, section 2-109 provided that 'a person 
born out of wedlock is . . . a child of the father, if... the 
paternity is established by an adjudication before the death 
of the father or is established thereafter by clear and con- 
vincing proof...' (Langbein & Waggoner 2003). The same 
section also recognized that men were more likely than 
women to deny support to their children by its provision 
that mothers could inherit from their illegitimate children 
but fathers could do so only if they had not refused to 
support them. These provisions were changed to be sex- 
neutral in the 1990 reforms. 
Despite hospital errors, human mothers, like other mam- 
malian mothers, are nearly certain of their maternity. Given 
their greater confidence, evolutionary theory predicts that 
if all else is equal mothers will give more property to off- 
spring than will fathers. Furthermore, evolutionary theory 
predicts that grandparents of either gender will give more 
to children of daughters than to children of sons. There are 
two links from a grandparent to a grandchild. Father-child 
links are less certain than mother-child links. Therefore, a 
brain built by rational, selfish genes would devote the most 
property to grandchildren connected by two maternal 
links, less to grandchildren connected by one maternal link 
and one paternal link, and the least to grandchildren con- 
nected by two paternal links. 
This prediction was confirmed by DeKay (1995). The 
subjects reported getting the most in gifts from their 
maternal grandmother and the least from their paternal 
grandfather. This result is probably not a result of the gen- 
eral tendency of women to give more than men because, on 
average, the mother's father gave more property than the 
father's mother. Gaulin et al. (1997) similarly found a 
matrilineal bias in the investment by aunts and uncles. 
Both aunts and uncles showed more concern for their sis- 
ters' children than for their brothers' children. One way for 
genes to favour the children of sisters is to generate a stron- 
ger tie to sisters. Thus it is not surprising that Salmon & 
Daly (1996) found that both male and female college stu- 
dents were more likely to name a sister than a brother as the 
sibling to whom they felt closest. The warmth for sisters' 
offspring reflects back upon the sisters themselves. 
Of course these findings reveal a lot about our attitudes 
towards other people. But they also reveal something about 
property. If the donative urge is millennia old, the sense of 
control over assets must stem from an even earlier date for 
it is hard to have a sense of how to allocate assets without 
first having a sense of what things are one's assets. It is a 
risky move for a parent to give his child property to which 
someone else feels attached. 
(iv) Wealth of the beneficiary 
In addition to age and genetic relatedness, there are 
other criteria that a well-adapted brain might use to deter- 
mine how to allocate property within its control. Donor 
behaviour ought to depend on the behaviour expected of 
donees. Donees can use resources for a number of pur- 
poses: to survive, to attract mates and provide for offspring. 
In pre-modern societies, wealth is indeed associated with 
reproductive success (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998); the 
relationship is less clear in developing and developed 
societies (Judge & Hrdy 1992; Low 2000). However, 
although any donee can make use of additional resources, 
they are not all equally likely to convert parental gifts of 
property into offspring. 
Evolutionary pressure could have shaped brains to send 
property where it will be most efficiently deployed. One 
factor that affects the ability of the donee to benefit from a 
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gift is the level of resources already available to that donee. 
That is, when instructing its body to shift resources to 
others, an efficient brain would take into account the 
resource level of the various potential donees. 
(v) Interaction of wealth and sex of recipient 
Another factor in the ability of the donees to make use of 
gifts in some situations might be their sex. Males and 
females do not have the same capacity for creating children 
(Low 2000). To take human examples, no woman on rec- 
ord has had even one-tenth as many children as Morocco's 
Emperor Moulay Ismail The Bloodthirsty, who claimed to 
have fathered more than 700 sons, and received credit for 
888 children in The Guinness Book of World Records 
(Pinker 1997). As Pinker (1997, p. 478) puts it, '[u]nder 
polygyny, men vie for extraordinary Darwinian stakes- 
many wives versus none-and the competition is literally 
cutthroat'. By necessity, the high reproductive success of 
some males ties up the reproductive capacities of multiple 
females, leaving other males with no opportunities to 
reproduce. The result is that the variation in number of off- 
spring is greater for males than for females. In their study of 
1500 Californians who died leaving wills, Judge & Hrdy 
(1992) found a variance of 3.45 for women, as compared 
with 4.34 for men. 
Any gender difference in the variance in reproduction 
creates the potential for a difference in the reproductive 
pay-off from resources. For example, Judge & Hrdy (1992) 
found that men whose estates were above the median value 
left more surviving children than did men whose estates 
were smaller. The same was not true, however, of women; 
those who left more wealth did not also leave more surviv- 
ing children. 
Trivers & Willard (1973) deduced that there could be an 
interactive effect between sex and resource level. The 
Trivers-Willard hypothesis says that the condition of ani- 
mals will influence whether they invest more resources in 
male or female offspring. The pay-off to additional resour- 
ces is nonlinear and differs by sex. Parents who cannot 
endow a son with enough resources to get him a mate 
should invest their resources in their female children if they 
are to maximize their reproductive success (Hartung 
1982). Parents who can put sons in a position to have more 
than one mate should direct more resources towards sons, 
or in some circumstances even concentrate them in a single 
son. There is evidence supporting this conjecture in the 
behaviour of mice (Rivers & Crawford 1974), spider mon- 
keys (McFarland Symington 1987) and red deer (Clutton- 
Brock et al. 1986). Evolution could have tailored the 
human brain to discriminate between sons and daughters 
in allocating the property within its control and to deter- 
mine that allocation differently depending on a number of 
factors, including the available resources. 
The Trivers-Willard hypothesis seems to dovetail with 
the ancient law of primogeniture (Boone 1986). Under 
primogeniture, a decedent's land passed to a single son, 
thereby maximizing that son's chances of becoming an 
alpha male and, hence, his reproductive opportunities. If 
the decedent had no son, his assets passed equally to his 
daughters, as might be adaptive according to Trivers and 
Willard. 
One problem with this explanation of the law of descent 
is that it does not explain why modern lawmakers have for- 
saken primogeniture in favour of equal distribution among 
children. The older and newer rules might be reconciled by 
focusing on the fact that primogeniture fits the needs of 
wealthier decedents, whereas egalitarian, modern law fits 
the needs of poorer decedents. If through the ages the law 
has come to incorporate more of the values and sentiments 
of people of modest means, this might help explain why the 
law has shifted from the rules of primogeniture to the mod- 
ern rules of more equal distribution. More likely, modern 
norms of equality have simply overridden the sentiments 
favouring a single male heir. 
Studies of individually directed giving are mixed on this 
issue of whether humans behave as predicted by Trivers 
and Willard. In support of the hypothesis, Smith et al. 
(1987) found that while the proportion of estates given to 
females did not vary much according to wealth, the pro- 
portion given to males shifted from about half that of 
females for poor families to twice that of females for 
wealthy families. Other support for Trivers-Willard has 
been found in fifteenth and sixteenth century Portuguese 
families (Boone 1986), the Yomut of Turkmenistan (Irons 
2000), and the Mukogodo of Kenya (Cronk 2000). How- 
ever, while Judge & Hrdy (1992) did find that parents 
showed more favouritism among sons than among daugh- 
ters, their study of California wills failed to find the other 
predicted interactive effect, that of greater giving to sons 
when there is greater wealth to give. Freese & Powell 
(1999) also failed to find the predicted interaction when 
they studied parental investment in adolescents. Borger- 
hoff Mulder (1998) found that survival rates in the Kipsigis 
of Kenya do not support Trivers-Willard, but parental 
investment in education does track the Trivers-Willard 
pattern, and increasingly so in recent years. 
The Trivers-Willard hypothesis might lead to an expla- 
nation of recently heralded findings regarding likelihood of 
divorce (Morgan et al. 1988; Dahl & Moretti 2004). 
Dahl & Moretti examined 60 years of US Census 
Bureau data and found that families with one girl were 
1-7% more likely to divorce than families with one boy, 
with the effect increasing with family size, but decreasing to 
zero over recent decades. Similarly, Morgan et al. (1988) 
had earlier found that sons reduce the risk of marital dis- 
ruption by 9% more than daughters. There are a number of 
conceivable explanations for these findings, including the 
possibilities that men want sons and keep marrying until 
they get one or that men become more involved in the fam- 
ily when they have a son. However, Trivers-Willard offers 
an explanation that is not rooted in a preference for sons or 
traditional gender roles. Because divorce is costly, it 
decreases family assets. Investing effort to keep a marriage 
together increases family assets available to the children, 
and thus could be seen as an investment in the children. 
Couples, or at least one of the partners, make a greater 
investment when they have a male child than when they 
have females. This difference in investment makes biologi- 
cal sense if inherited wealth is more important to a son's 
reproductive success than to a daughter's, which Trivers- 
Willard argues would be the case when the parents are rich 
in resources. What remains to be determined is whether the 
divorce rate is a function of the interaction of wealth and 
sex of the child. 
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The Trivers-Willard theory might explain the divorce 
data in another, somewhat backwards and as yet incom- 
pletely explained, way. Because mothers can invest less in 
male offspring by bearing fewer of them, the theory 
suggests that mothers poor in resources might produce 
relatively more female offspring, whereas mothers rich in 
resources might produce more males. This prediction was 
borne out in an experimental field study in which female 
opossums given supplemental provisions produced more 
male offspring than did controls (Austad & Sunquist 
1986), and it has been observed that female red deer (Clut- 
ton-Brock et al. 1986) and spider monkeys (McFarland 
Symington 1987) produce a higher ratio of males if they are 
high in rank. For human examples, consider that wives of 
American Presidents have borne 86 male and 58 female 
children (Betzig & Weber 1995), and white American 
mothers, who are statistically richer, have relatively more 
male children than black American mothers (National 
Center for Health Statistics 1999). Some women can 
anticipate divorce, certainly if they are contemplating initi- 
ating proceedings but maybe also if they sense such an 
inclination on the part of their husbands. Married women 
sensing an unmarried future are also sensing a lower 
level of support, and for that reason would be 
predicted by the Trivers-Willard theory to have more 
female children, although the physiological mechanism for 
this is unclear (McFarland Symington 1987). Also, such 
women, who have the sense that they might be unmarried 
at a later date, might indeed be more likely to be unmarried 
at a later date. Viewed after the divorce, it looks like the 
daughters helped cause the divorce, but instead the 
impending divorce helped cause the daughters. 
Further research could examine the Trivers-Willard 
proposition in the context of both lifetime and testamen- 
tary human altruism. A study of lifetime giving might, 
for example, investigate whether wealthier parents in 
industrialized societies offer their male children dis- 
proportionately better opportunities for college educations. 
Inequality in such a domain would be less obvious to the 
donors and, hence, be less likely to be purposively over- 
come by persons ordinarily attentive to the social norm of 
equality. It also could be the case that the adaptation itself 
is sensitive to the perceived connection between repro- 
ductive success and wealth. In other words, if people do not 
see wealthier men having substantially higher numbers of 
children, they do not perceive a winner-take-all race and 
they might not feel any urge to give more to their sons. 
Another possibility is that modern egalitarian social norms 
have overcome a Trivers-Willard discriminatory adap- 
tation, even if humans are born with one. 
(b) Attracting mates 
The instinct to care for one's children has no application 
until there are children to care for. An even more basic 
instinct, then, is to perform the steps needed to create 
offspring. One of those steps is attracting a mate, and being 
generous might advance that cause. A woman who sees a 
man being generous has some reason to believe that the 
man will be generous to her, helping her to survive. He 
might also be generous to his children (Buss 1999), helping 
them to survive, and helping them to attract mates (if they 
are generous in turn), all of which redounds to the genetic 
benefit of their mother. Thus, to a female brain evolved to 
respond to the potential benefits of charity, the generous 
male looks like a better prospect than the skinflint. Because 
generosity attracts persons who expect to be beneficiaries, 
generosity towards mates and potential mates brings sexual 
opportunities. Therefore, such giving should be expected 
and is consistent with the theory that people are selfish 
reproducers. Anderson et al. (1999) offer some evidence 
that men use their charity to impress potential partners. 
They found that a child was nearly three times as likely to 
receive money for college from its father or stepfather if 
he was living with the mother at the time the child entered 
college. 
Gifts that become effective at the death of the donor can 
do little to improve the dead person's sexual opportu- 
nities. Nevertheless, Fellows et al. (1978) found that the 
desire to give to mates continues to the end of life. It could 
be that giving to spouses at death is just a vestige of the 
habit of giving during life. But another way to look at tes- 
tamentary gifts to spouses is that, because a will is made 
during life, the charitable value of the will is actually 
enjoyed during life. Thus, testamentary giving may still be 
an act of courtship. 
There is another biological explanation for testamentary 
gifts to spouses. Decedents can reasonably expect their sur- 
viving spouses to pass a portion of the gifts on to their chil- 
dren. Judge (1995) found that men often expressed 
confidence that their wives would provide for, or pass pro- 
perty along to, their common children. Among those estates 
studied by Judge & Hrdy (1992), when men died they left 
nearly 70% of their assets to their spouses. That men ordi- 
narily expected a portion of these assets to reach their chil- 
dren is indicated by the fact that in one-quarter of the cases 
in which they took the unusual step of leaving less than half 
of their assets to their surviving spouse, they did so to leave 
the large bulk of their estate to children from previous mar- 
riages. When women died, they left less of their assets to their 
surviving spouses than did men, perhaps in part because 
their husbands might remarry and devote some of those 
resources to children of that new marriage. Indeed, when 
couples marry at an older age, having already produced chil- 
dren with previous mates, they often make premarital agree- 
ments designed to direct assets to their own children rather 
than to their spouses or their spouses' children. 
In their basic approach, modern English and American 
laws of intestacy track the preference for generosity towards 
mates by allocating a substantial portion of the decedent's 
estate to the surviving spouse (Megarry & Wade 1984; 
Uniform Probate Code section 2-103 (Langbein & Wag- 
goner 2003)). Some variants track the evolutionary model 
a bit more closely by paying attention to whether the sur- 
viving children were children of both the decedent and the 
surviving spouse or just one of them. Section 2-102 of the 
Uniform Probate Code (Langbein & Waggoner 2003) pro- 
vides that more assets go to the surviving children and 
fewer go to the surviving spouse when the decedent leaves 
children whose other parent is not the surviving spouse. 
When the survivor was not the parent of all of the dece- 
dent's children, the decedent cannot count on as much 
generosity from the survivor to the decedent's children by 
other parents. To achieve the same balance of giving 
between children and spouse when the surviving spouse is 
less likely to give to the decedent's children, the decedent 
has to give more to them directly rather than relying on the 
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survivor to be a conduit. Similarly, when the decedent was 
the parent of only some of the survivor's children, the 
decedent might not wish to support those other children as 
fully as the decedent's own children and so must give assets 
directly to the decedent's children rather than to the spouse 
as a proxy because the spouse will not distinguish between 
the children as the decedent would have wished. 
There have long been limitations on the minimum that a 
decedent could leave to his or her surviving spouse. 
According to Geddes & Zak (2002) many legal systems 
have assured the wife one-third of the husband's estate 
upon the husband's death. They argue that the 'rule of one- 
third' increases the mother's investment in their children. If 
she were not guaranteed such a share, the wife would 
expend too little effort on mothering their children and too 
much effort acquiring resources for herself. If she were 
assured more than one-third, she would invest more in the 
children, but that would leave less for the men, which 
would not be favoured in a patriarchal legal system. 
The various arguments here should not be read to contend 
that the law was written expressly to achieve biological goals. 
Some laws of intestate succession have been drafted to mimic 
what people would do on their own (Fellows et al. 1978; 
Beckstrom 1985), to achieve decedents' desires without need 
for any action by the decedents. Other normative goals 
include justice. But no matter which, our biology is involved. 
The laws of intestacy extend the human phenotype. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Property is more than a social invention; it is set of feelings 
built into our brains to solve survival problems confronting 
our ancestors. There are many dimensions to the property 
instinct, ranging from what constitutes property to what to 
do with property. Doubtless, these dimensions of the pro- 
perty instinct will be developed further, corrected and clari- 
fied, and other dimensions will be discovered as the science 
of behaviour progresses. Exploration and improved under- 
standing of the property instinct should help us to place the 
various property laws on a more scientific footing than is 
possible today. 
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